object, the authors claim that Aquinas rejects both Abelard's emphasis upon the agent's intended remote end and Peter Lombard's emphasis upon the moral character of the exterior act itself, specified independently of the agent's will. 6 Finnis claims elsewhere that Aquinas finds Lombard's account to be "excessive" in this respect. 7 In order to support this account of the moral object, which they claim is also the doctrine of the Roman Magisterium, 8 Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle appeal to John Paul II's statement in Veritatis splendor §78 that "in order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person."
9 The Pontiff 's statement here is interpreted in such a way that his emphasis upon the perspective of the acting person is taken to indicate that the moral object specifying that person's act can be nothing other than the proposed end that that person intends to realize. In this way, Finnis argues in a previous study that a moral act is whatever the agent intends that act to be. 10 Finnis claims that his emphasis upon the agent's subjective proposal is not aimed to advance a methodology for rationalizing the performance of immoral acts.
11 Grisez, however, does argue in an early essay that his methodological emphasis upon the agent's proposal allows for a revision of the principle of double effect that thereafter enables it "to justify acts hitherto regarded as evil." an author whose work Finnis cites.
14 Rhonheimer (while disagreeing with Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle in some details 15 ) also urges that the moral object be construed as a proposal of the acting person. 16 His interpretation is endorsed or echoed by Sousa-Lara, 17 Rodríguez Luño, 18 and William Murphy. 19 Rhonheimer's emphasis upon the agent's subjective proposal is a key component of his overall interpretation of Aquinas, which he describes as concerned with developing Aquinas's moral doctrine, 20 as seeking what Rhonheimer calls an "advanced Thomism" that can dialogue with "modern moral thinking." 21 A number of concerns have been raised with understanding the moral object as the agent's proposal. Jean Porter, for example, questions how Grisez's emphasis upon the agent's subjective proposal (apart from causal considerations) can retain objective moral criteria for evaluating moral acts. 22 Kevin Flannery rejects the methodology of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle as involving an "artificial redescription" that veils the true 461 In response, it must be recognized that, while it is true that primacy should be given to the moral object when evaluating a human act, the moral object must not be identified ontologically with an agent's subjective proposal. This is especially so if such a proposal is construed as an artificial design of productive reason. In order to establish these points, the current study approaches Aquinas's account of the moral object with a particular focus upon his doctrine of sins of ignorance. In connection with this focus, consideration must also be given to Aquinas's account of the imputation of sin.
Aquinas and the Roman Magisterium both affirm that there can be sins of ignorance. While primary attention here is given to Aqui- If . . . ignorance is invincible, or the moral subject is not responsible for his erroneous judgment, the evil committed by the person cannot be imputed to him. It remains no less an evil, a privation, a disorder. One must therefore work to correct the errors of moral conscience.
31
These passages lead to a concise point: since there can be sins of ignorance, appeal cannot be made to the Magisterium to support the view that the moral object specifying an agent's act is to be identified ontologically with the agent's subjective proposal. This likewise holds when interpreting Aquinas: his texts that affirm that the per se specification of a moral act derives from what the agent intends must be read within the overall context of his doctrine of sins of ignorance. While there can be a specification of an exterior moral act by the (potentially corrupt) subjective reason of a particular agent, the ultimate formal measure of any exterior moral act is found in light of God and right reason.
In order to establish these claims, the present study briefly considers the historical context of Aquinas's moral theology. 32 It then gives focused attention to three particular details in Aquinas's texts. First, Aquinas distinguishes between the moral object in itself and the moral object as known. Second, since an agent may suffer from moral ignorance, one must consider the issue of imputation ( extent a morally ignorant agent is responsible for his or her exterior moral act). Third, the topic of imputation leads to examining Aquinas's distinction between formal and material sin on the part of the agent, where material sin involves a disordered exterior moral act as measured in light of God and right reason. After seeking to establish these points on a textual basis, a final observation is given here regarding a proper Thomistic interpretation of John Paul II's statement in Veritatis splendor §78.
Aquinas's Texts
The Historical Context of Aquinas's Moral Theology In his mature work, Ethica (c. 1139), 33 Abelard teaches that, when God evaluates the moral character of a person, God is concerned with the agent's intention, not his or her action. He writes, "God doesn't think about the things that are done but rather in what mind they are done. The merit or praiseworthiness of the doer doesn't consist in the deed but in the intention."
34 Abelard maintains that the word "sin" thus has two meanings: either as applied to the deed or as applied to the agent's intention, where the latter is given emphasis. In this respect, he considers whether Christ's executioners sinned. "Those who persecuted Christ or his followers," Abelard writes, "and believed they should be persecuted, we say sinned through action. Nevertheless, they would have sinned more seriously through fault if they had spared them contrary to conscience." 35 While an unintentional "sin through action" or a sin of ignorance involves a misdeed, it does not, for Abelard, involve guilt. As another example, Abelard mentions adultery through ignorance (an example to which the discussion will return when considering Aquinas's texts below). If . . . it is impossible to sin through ignorance, what case have we against the slayers of the apostles, who were not only unaware that it was wrong to kill these men, but believed that in so doing they were obeying God? Groundless, too, was the Savior's prayer for his crucifiers, who, as he himself bore witness, had no idea what they were doing, and so were committing no sin. . . . Is it not plain from these examples how deeply those who fail to realize that ignorance can be a cause of sin are plunged into its own darkness?
40
Events later culminated at the local council of Sens (c. 1141), 41 which condemned the ethical judgment that "they have not sinned who being ignorant have crucified Christ, and that whatever is done through ignorance must not be considered as sin." the generic moral goodness or moral evil of an act in distinction forty of book II of the Libri sententiarum. He states, "it is asked whether all the works of man are good or evil from affective disposition and end." 43 In response to this question, he considers three options regarding whether acts can be morally good or evil in themselves apart from cause and end. The first option, which seems to be the doctrine of Abelard, is that acts in themselves are neither morally good nor morally evil but rather morally indifferent. 44 A second option is that acts are morally good or morally evil in themselves to such an extent that an act which is morally good remains good even when it has an evil cause or an evil end. 45 Lombard rejects both of these alternatives. Rather, he approves of a third option, one he construes to be the teaching of Augustine in Contra mendacium. 46 In this text, Augustine contends that certain acts can be morally good or evil in themselves and also that a morally good act can be vitiated by an evil cause or evil end. 47 To relate this doctrine, Lombard quotes chapter 7 of Augustine's Contra mendacium at great length. 48 He then closes by summarizing Augustine's account, stating:
A will or action is not always judged to be evil from its end, as is the case with those things which are sins in themselves.
For when one has done these things for some good cause, they appear to have a good end; and the will is not evil as a result of the end, nor is the action made evil as a result of the will, but the will is made depraved as a result of the action.
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The Moral Object in Itself and as Known Lombard mediated the twelfth-century moral problematic initiated by Abelard to Aquinas, who encountered the Libri sententiarum in association with its Parisian reception, heavily influenced by Aristotle. In order to examine Aquinas's response to this problematic, consideration here will be given to Aquinas In his doctrine, Aquinas observes that a moral act may be oriented toward multiple ends-for example, a proximate end and a remote end. The interior act of the agent's will is indeed specified in accordance with the moral object chosen as a proximate end. 53 But the moral object is also the matter of a human act that establishes the exterior act in its generic moral character, as described by Lombard, quoted above. 54 The object qua matter is the materia circa quam, the "matter about which" the act is concerned, and not "matter from which" something is made, materia ex qua. 55 Generic moral goodness or moral evil is found in an exterior human act bearing upon due or undue matter, respectively.
56
Due or undue matter is distinct from the due or undue circumstances surrounding an agent's individual act, and also distinct from the exterior act's due or undue ordering to a further remote end. 
53
De malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 9: "Duplex est finis: proximus et remotus. Finis proximus actus idem est quod obiectum, et ab hoc recipit speciem. Ex fine autem remoto non habet speciem; sed ordo ad talem finem est circumstantia actus." See also De malo q. 2, a. 6, ad 9, and q. 2, a. 7, ad 8.
54
De malo, q. 10, a. 2: "genus sive species actus moralis attenditur secundum materiam vel obiectum; unde etiam actus moralis dicitur bonus vel malus secundum suum genus."
55
ST I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2: "obiectum non est materia ex qua, sed materia circa quam: et habet quodammodo rationem formae, inquantum dat speciem." See also ST I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 1: "obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur actus, habet tamen rationem finis secundum quod intentio agentis fertur in ipsum." The agent's exterior moral act and the interior act of the agent's will both relate to the same object, which terminates the exterior and interior movements. Yet, the object terminates the exterior moral act as the materia circa quam, whereas it terminates the interior act of the will as a chosen proximate end. 58 The former can be the proper object of a power that is moved by the will when seeking a further remote end. 59 And while in some cases it may be that the exterior moral act itself is its own term, 60 in general the exterior moral act is specified by the materia circa quam (ab obiecto circa quod est). 61 As such, and in contrast with Finnis' reading, Aquinas in fact affirms Lombard's teaching that certain kinds of exterior moral acts can be specified independently of an agent's will. 62 An exterior moral act so specified may then serve as a proximate end that is proposed to the will for choice.
63
As distinct from its character as materia circa quam, the moral object takes on its character as a proximate end in accordance with a formal ratio, understood here as an intellectual measure. 64 The formal ratio in ST II-II, q. 47, a. 11: "species habituum diversificantur secundum diversitatem obiecti quae attenditur penes rationem formalem ipsius. Ratio autem formalis omnium quae sunt ad finem attenditur ex parte finis."
accordance with which the agent grasps the moral object is of key importance regarding the moral specification of his or her interior act of the will. In De malo, Aquinas states, "in moral matters, the object constitutes the species by reason of the formal ratio of the object, not by its material element." 65 Aquinas echoes this teaching with examples in his third quodlibetal question dated around the same time. 66 In the quodlibet, Aquinas states, "Although an act receives its species from the object, it nevertheless does not receive the species according to the object's matter, but according to the ratio of the object."
67 When an agent grasps an object in accordance with a formal ratio, the object is then proposed to the will as an end, specifying the interior act of the agent's will and constituting that agent's intention. 68 In this way, Aquinas states that one and the same human act can be considered materially with respect to its materia circa quam (the object in relation to the exterior moral act) and formally with respect to its end (the same object in relation to the interior act of the will).
69
In order to explain the relationship between an object and a formal ratio, Aquinas frequently employs the analogy of color and light. 70 A moral act, he states, tends to both the object and to the formal ratio of the object simultaneously, just as sight tends to both color and light simultaneously. 71 The formal ratio of an object is attained by an exercise of reason. An agent's reason may exemplify rectitude or, alternatively, be 65 De malo, q. 9, a. 2, ad 10: "in moralibus obiectum constituit speciem, non secundum id quod est materiale in ipso, sed secundum formalem rationem obiecti." corrupt.
72 Right reason as cultivated by the moral virtue of prudence will guide the agent to conform his or her will to the Divine Will. 73 As the foundation of right reason, it is God, the eternal moral law, who is the primary measure of the rectitude of the interior act of the will. 74 At the same time, Aquinas argues that an agent's will is obliged to follow the judgments of corrupt reason. In article 5 of question 19 of the prima secundae in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas considers the question of whether the will is evil when it differs from the guidance of corrupt reason. 75 In the course of answering this question affirmatively, Aquinas makes an important distinction between the moral object in itself and the moral object as known by reason. The passage is worth quoting at length. He writes:
In matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid. . . . And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. . . .To believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. ST II-II, q. 155, a. 1, ad 2: "solus vere continens dicitur qui tenet se in eo quod est secundum rationem rectam; non autem in eo quod est secendum rationem perversam."
73
ST II-II, q. 154, a. 2, ad 2: "Ratio autem hominis recta est secundum quod regulatur voluntate divina, quae est prima et summa regula. Et ideo quod homo facit ex voluntate Dei, eius praecepto obediens, non est contra rationem rectam."
74
ST I-II, q. 19, a. 4: "Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege aeterna, quae est ratio divina."
75
ST I-II, q. 19, a. 5: "Utrum voluntas discordans a ratione errante sit mala."
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ST I-II, q. 19, a. 5: "In indifferentibus enim voluntas discordans a ratione vel conscientia errante est mala aliquo modo propter obiectum, a quo bonitas vel malitia voluntatis dependet; non autem propter obiectum secundum sui naturam; sed secundum quod per accidens a ratione apprehenditur ut malum ad faciendum vel ad vitandum…. Hoc autem contingit non solum in indifferentibus, sed etiam in per se bonis vel malis…. Credere in Christum est per se bonum et necessarium ad salutem, sed voluntas non fertur in hoc, nisi Because Aquinas here differentiates the moral object in its own nature from the moral object as apprehended by the intellect and as proposed to the will as an end, the moral object cannot be identified ontologically with a proposal of subjective reason. Although an agent's reason mediates the moral object to his will, his reason does not originate that object as such. Aquinas makes a similar point in De malo, where he observes that there can be an evil object mistakenly loved as good, while a good object can be mistakenly avoided as evil. 77 These passages manifest that, for Aquinas, the moral object is not merely a design of productive reason. Rather, human reason can make a mistake when it measures the materia circa quam. Aquinas's distinction between the moral object in itself and the moral object as known is an instantiation of his broader cognitional judgment that "the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower."
78 A reading of Aquinas that identifies the moral object in itself with the moral object as known risks misrepresenting his account by ontologically reducing the materia circa quam to a subjective proposal that reason presents to the will as an end. 79 This confuses the moral object in itself with the moral object as known and opens the door to replacing sound prudential judgment with a design of productive reason. Hence, Flannery's concern with an "artificial" method of specification is well founded.
Imputation
According to Aquinas, a rational agent who performs an exterior act involving a moral privation performs an "undue operation." 80 The question at hand is whether a deformed exterior moral act is ascribable to the agent. Is he or she morally responsible for the performed secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Unde si a ratione proponatur ut malum, voluntas feretur in hoc ut malum; non quia illud sit malum secundum se, sed quia est malum per accidens ex apprehensione rationis."
77
De malo, q. 10, a. 1, ad 8: "sicut in amore boni non potest esse peccatum, nisi in quantum id quod amatur, etso apprehendatur in ratione boni, non tamen est vere bonum, sed malum: ita etiam tristitia quae est in bono, quod apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum sed apparens." See, for example, ST I, q. 48, a. 5: "Malum autem quod consistit in subtractione debitae operationis in rebus voluntariis, habet rationem culpae. Hoc enim imputatur alicui in culpam, cum deficit a perfecta actione, cuius dominus est secundum voluntatem." action? The question touches on the Pauline distinction between sin and the imputation of sin. 81 In general, a deformed exterior moral action is imputable to an agent to the extent that that agent performed that action voluntarily (some important qualifications to this claim are considered below). 82 The criterion of the will's mastery over the act is thus of key importance when assessing imputation. In De malo, Aquinas maintains that it is because of a defect in the will that a privation in an agent's deformed exterior moral act can be imputed to that agent. 83 Unlike Abelard, yet again echoing Lombard, Aquinas indicates that there can be proper sin or evil in an exterior moral act even though that act is involuntary. The exterior moral act remains deformed whether or not it is imputed to the agent. 84 Aquinas also cites Augustine in this respect. 85 In one passage, Aquinas explains that an exterior act may be morally specified according to its materia circa quam apart from the agent's intention because its effect resolves into that exterior act as a voluntary cause. He writes:
A thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who willfully gets drunk, for in that case that which he does through being drunk is imputed to him as if it were voluntary. 86 Further, Aquinas maintains that if the object of an act is an effect, then that effect is the term of the act and therefore specifies that act. When there is an unintended effect, the interior act of the will may be understood as a per accidens cause and not as a per se cause. 88 The deformity of the exterior moral act in such a case remains apart from subjective intentionality. 89 In this respect, certain kinds of exterior moral acts may be measured as undue in precision from an agent's subjective intention: such acts are generically considered in light of God and right reason. 90 This generic consideration comprises the task of moral theology and moral philosophy, respectively.
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With respect to the imputation of a deformed exterior moral act to the agent, Aquinas considers in the Summa theologiae how an action that would ordinarily involve the imputation of mortal sin can, in certain cases, involve the lesser imputation of venial sin. This happens in the absence of deliberate reason. 92 In this passage, Aquinas indicates that the privation "present" in the act (its deformity) imputes to the agent in various degrees in proportion to the voluntariness of the agent's performance of that act. As an example of a condition that might result in the absence of deliberate reason (and thus limiting imputation), Aquinas mentions demonic possession. 93 aliquo modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem; motus enim habet speciem a terminis. -Et quamvis etiam bonitas actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa proportio actionis ad effectum est ratio bonitatis ipsius."
88
De malo, q. 2, a. 1: "Sed voluntas est causa alicuius quandoque quidem per se, quandoque autem per accidens; per se quidem, sicut quando per intentionem agit ad talem effectum… per accidens autem, sicut quando praeter intentionem."
89
ST I, q. 48, a. 5: "Malum autem quod consistit in subtractione debitae operationis in rebus voluntariis, habet rationem culpae. Hoc enim imputatur alicui in culpam, cum deficit a perfecta actione, cuius dominus est secundum voluntatem."
90
De malo, q. 2, a. 2: "Deformitas autem actus est per hoc quod discordat a debita regula rationis vel legis Dei. Quae quidem deformitas invenitur non solum in actu interiori, sed etiam exteriori."
91
ST I-II, q. 71, a. 6, ad 5: "a theologis consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum quod est offensa contra Deum; a philosopho autem morali, secundum quod contrariatur rationi. Et ideo Augustinus convenientibus definit peccatum ex hoc quod est contra legem aeternam."
92
ST I-II, q. 88, a. 6: "Potest tamen id quod est ex genere mortale, esse veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia non perfecte pertingit ad rationem actus moralis, cum non sit deliberatus sed subitus…. Et hoc fit per subtractionem quandam, scilicet deliberatae rationis. Et quia a ratione deliberata habet speciem moralis actus, inde est quod per talem subtractionem solvitur species."
93
ST I-II, q. 80, a. 3: "homo motivo ad peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem; cuius usum totaliter impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum
Formal Sin and Material Sin
Just as with the matter of how the imputation of sin can be lessened from mortal to venial, so too does Aquinas consider how the imputation of sin can be nullified altogether. 94 When a deformed exterior moral act cannot be imputed to the agent, Aquinas describes its moral species as "dissolved."
95 His reference to the dissolution of the moral species may be taken to apply to the specification of the interior act of the will. When the species is dissolved, there is no imputation, and thus no formal sin or culpability. At the same time, since sin is broader in scope than culpability, one can still refer to "material sins." Imputation involves an agent's sin qua culpability; just as evil is broader in scope than sin, so is sin broader in scope than culpability. 96 In this passage, Aquinas arguably is not merely discussing natural malfunctions, which he also states are without culpability. 97 Rather, since the exterior act may be evaluated as a voluntary cause in precision from the agent's intention (as discussed above), the exterior act itself can be specified in accordance with its own moral character. It is in this way that Aquinas refers to a "material sin."
Aquinas explicitly discusses the material specification of the exterior moral act in De malo. He writes:
Every circumstance constituting a species of sin necessarily makes the sin more serious. . . . And if such a circumstance is completely unknown in accordance with an ignorance which does not involve culpability, it will not constitute a species of sin formally speaking, but only materially. 98 sensitivum, sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quiquid homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum."
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ST I-II, q. 88, a. 6, ad 2: "si sit talis ignorantia quae peccatum omnino excuset, sicut est furiosi vel amentis, tunc ex tali ignorantia fornicationem commitens nec venialiter nec mortaliter peccat."
95
ST I-II, q. 88, a. 6.
96
ST II-II, q. 21, a. 2: "sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti; nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus."
97
ST I-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 1: "actus naturales non sunt in potestate naturalis agentis, cum natura sit determinata ad unum. Et ideo, licet in actibus naturalibus sit peccatum, non tamen est ibi culpa."
98
De malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 11: "omnis circumstantia constituens aliquam speciem peccati, necesse est quod aggravet…. Si autem talis circumstantia sit penitus ignorata tali ignorantia quae non habeat culpam, speciem peccati non constituet formaliter loquendo, sed materialiter tantum."
Material specification should be identified with the specification of the exterior moral act, whereas formal specification should be identified with the specification of the interior act of the will. To illustrate his point regarding material sin in De malo, Aquinas employs Abelard's example of committing adultery in ignorance. He states:
If a man has sexual intercourse with a married woman whom he does not know to be married, he indeed commits what is adultery, yet not as an adulterer, since the form of a moral act proceeds from reason and the will. But what is unknown is not voluntary. And so if a man were to have sexual intercourse with the wife of another whom he thinks to be his own wife, he would be without sin, as when Jacob was brought to lie with Leah instead of Rachel.
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His biblical reference is to Genesis 29:21-25. 100 Aquinas makes this same distinction elsewhere when he describes formal sin as affective sin and material sin as effective sin. 101 this same teaching in the next article on injustice 105 and in his famous passage on self-defense. 106 In these passages, he is speaking in terms of assessing the imputation of formal sin.
In De malo, Aquinas states that a deformed exterior moral act may even be imputed to an agent regardless of that agent's intention if that agent knows that foreseeable bad effects will follow from what the agent intends. He writes:
Sometimes an accidental product of an effect is in very few cases and rarely associated with the effect, and then the cause, in intending the per se effect, need not in any way intend the per accidens effect. And sometimes such an accident always or in most cases accompanies the effect chiefly intended, and then the accident is not dissociated from the intention of the cause. Therefore, if an evil is in very few cases associated with the good that the will intends, the will can be excused from sin. . . . But if evil is always or in most cases associated with the good per se intended, the will is not excused from sin, although the will does not per se intend the evil. 107 An allegedly unintended per accidens effect (if foreseen) may, in the end, be formally imputed to the agent.
There is another situation in which a deformed exterior moral act may be imputed to an agent regardless of that agent's intention. Recall 110 in a gloss on the passage where Christ relates culpability to the acquisition of knowledge. 111 While, in general, a deformed exterior moral action is imputable to an agent to the extent that that agent performed that action voluntarily, there are some important qualifications to keep in mind when interpreting Aquinas. First, one has to take into consideration Aquinas's distinction between invincible and vincible ignorance, 112 as well as his distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory knowledge.
113 Such obligatory knowledge might enable an agent to recognize an integral condition of an exterior moral act or judge that the materia circa quam upon which an exterior act bears involves undue matter. 114 Aquinas addresses the issue of obligatory moral knowledge explicitly in article 6 of question 19 of the prima secundae in the Summa, where he asks whether the will is good when it agrees with the guidance of corrupt reason. 115 It is this article, according to Joseph Ratzinger, that clearly separates the doctrine of Aquinas from the teaching of Abelard.
116 Here Aquinas observes that, "ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not." 117 In order to explain how ignorance in some cases does not cause an act to be involuntary, Aquinas distinguishes between different kinds of "willed ignorance." 118 When there is willed ignorance with respect to obligatory moral knowledge (either as directly intended or as indirectly willed by way of negligence), the unintentional performance of a deformed exterior moral act is imputable to the agent. 119 This occurs, for example, when one wills to be ignorant of the revealed moral law. 120 Such a deformed exterior moral act is imputable to an ignorant agent as long as his or her ignorance is not invincible. 121 On the other hand, an agent is excused who sins as a result of a lack of knowledge that he or she had no obligation to acquire. 122 here as a synonym for an "integral condition" of an exterior moral act. 125 It is helpful to refer to non-specifying circumstances as "genuine circumstances" and to refer to specifying circumstances as "integral conditions" of an exterior moral act. 126 As a further example of ignorance of an integral condition, Aquinas elsewhere considers someone who mistakes how much alcohol he or she can ingest without incurring drunkenness. 127 In yet another passage, Aquinas describes a parricide mistaken as a regular homicide 128 (this example is similar to one of Aristotle's 129 ). It is important to ask in moral assessment whether or not an agent willed himself to be ignorant of an integral condition of his exterior act, as well as whether or not the agent was obligated to obtain that knowledge.
A final related point concerns Aquinas's doctrine of affected ignorance. When Aquinas considers the question of the sin of Christ's executioners, he divides the various parties into three categories. The Sanhedrin, he maintains, had an "affected ignorance," and as such it "could not excuse them." 130 (Aquinas elsewhere explains in the Summa that affected ignorance is present when one wills to be ignorant in order to have an excuse for one's actions; 131 he quotes Job 21:14 to illustrate this point 132 ). In contrast to the affected ignorance of the Sanhedrin, the Jewish mob who pleaded for Christ's crucifixion before Pilate must be considered separately. With respect to the act evaluated "as a genus of sin," Aquinas affirms that the mob "sinned most grievously," but "in one respect their crime was lessened by reason of their ignorance." 133 When considering Christ's prayer asking God the Father to pardon Christ's executioners due to their ignorance, 134 Aquinas contends that one should understand Christ's prayer as pertaining to the mob and not to the Sanhedrin. 135 At the same time, Aquinas indicates that their act was less excusable than that of the Gentiles who crucified Christ, for the common Jewish people did have knowledge of the revealed moral law. 136 In each category, one must observe that Aquinas does affirm the presence of sin. His differentiation of the parties into categories involves to what extent the sin is imputable. Such is entirely so in the case of the Sanhedrin, less so in the case of the Jewish mob, and significantly less with respect to the Gentiles lacking moral knowledge. Aquinas's judgment follows the criterion that the subjective imputation of sin is proportionate to the degree of an informed conscience. He does not teach, however, that persons suffering from moral ignorance are not able to commit a deformed exterior act.
Afterword: Interpreting Veritatis splendor §78
If a Thomistic interpretation of Veritatis splendor §78 takes into consideration the foregoing discussion, the Pontiff 's teaching cannot be said to condone a moral methodology where an agent may design a moral object which artificially brackets an integral condition of an exterior moral act. Such a practice will involve a kind of methodologically affected ignorance. This ignorance will be directly voluntary, and therefore culpable. Flannery is thus entirely correct to raise a concern with any approach to moral specification that entails an artificial structuring of the formal ratio in accordance with which the moral object is grasped.
In closing, when John Paul II states, "in order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person," 137 the object under consideration in this passage should be understood in two ways. First, the object under consideration should be understood materially with respect to the agent's exterior moral act that relates to the object as materia circa quam. In this respect, an exterior act as specified in light of God and right reason may involve a material sin regardless of the agent's intention. Second, the object under consideration should be understood formally with respect to the interior act of the agent's will. In this respect, the agent may or may not be formally culpable for performing a deformed exterior moral act (depending upon whether ignorance is involved and what kind). In either respect, the passage should not be read as ontologically identifying the moral object with a subjectively designed proposal.
